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Marriage Equality in New Jersey: 
Love, Law, and Political Appointments 
“The right to marry is the right to enter into a relationship that is the center of the personal 
affections that ennoble and enrich human life.”1   
Introduction 
 Names are important.  So important, in fact, that most studies show that despite the 
feminist upsurge of the 1970’s, the horror of notifying multiple credit card carriers, and the 
torture of dealing with Social Security, at least 85% of women today change their surnames after 
marriage.
2
  Traditionally, changing one’s name marked the beginning of a new journey—a 
“changed life course or purpose.”3  Most importantly, implicit in this notion is the concept that 
the name of marriage, itself, is important.  That by choosing to marry rather than date or 
cohabitate, we choose a new life direction that is reflected in the words we use to describe 
ourselves and our lives together. 
 In a 2006 landmark challenge to New Jersey’s marriage laws, the state Supreme Court 
held in Lewis v. Harris that refusing to extend the benefits and responsibilities of marriage to 
same-sex couples violated New Jersey’s state constitution.4  However, the decision was only a 
partial victory for marriage equality advocates.  While the members of the bench unanimously 
agreed that state marriage laws violated the Equal Protection Clause, the court divided regarding 
the remedy.
5
  A four-justice majority ultimately held that the legislature could choose to extend 
                                                          
1
  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (quoting De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal.2d 858, 863–864 (Cal. 
1952)) (internal quotations omitted). 
2
  Laura Dawn Lewis, Why Brides Change Last Names, Couplescompany.com, October 3, 2005, 
http://www.couplescompany.com/features/changename.htm. 
3
  Id. 
4
  Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (2006). 
5
  Id. at 224 - 30. 
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the state of marriage to same-sex couples or create civil unions, a “parallel statutory structure.”6  
The legislature chose the lesser of two conservative evils, and same-sex couples were once again 
denied the right to marry.
7
 
In December 2006, the Legislature enacted the Civil Union Act and established the New 
Jersey Civil Union Review Commission (“the Commission”), an independent body charged with 
evaluating the efficacy of the Act in securing equal rights for same-sex couples.
8
  Less than two 
years after the Civil Union Act was enacted, the Commission reported (not surprisingly) that 
civil unions did not in fact confer equal rights upon same-sex couples.
9
  Instead, it found that 
civil unions “invite and encourage unequal treatment of same-sex couples and their children.”10  
Ultimately, the Commission recommended that the state of New Jersey maintain the institution 
of Domestic Partnerships,
11
 but abolish Civil Unions and amend state marriage laws to allow 
same-sex couples to marry.
12
  
For the briefest of windows between the Commission issuing its report and former 
Democrat Governor Jon Corzine leaving office, it seemed that marriage equality might truly be 
realized.
13
  Governor Corzine promised that he would sign a same-sex marriage bill if it was 
passed by the New Jersey Senate.
14
  Unfortunately, the Senate rejected a marriage amendment on 
                                                          
6
  Id. at 224. 
7
  The Legislature enacted Public Law 2006, Chapter 103, establishing civil unions effective February 19, 2007 (the 
“Civil Union Act”).  New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission, THE LEGAL, MEDICAL, ECONOMIC, & SOCIAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF NEW JERSEY’S CIVIL UNION LAW:  FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY CIVIL UNION REVIEW 
COMMISSION  1 (2008),  available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcr/downloads/CURC-Final-Report-.pdf; Civil Union 
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1-28 (e)-(f) (West 2010). 
8
  Id. 
9
  Id. at 1. 
10
  Id. at 1.  
11
  Id. 
12
  New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission, supra note 7, at 3. 
13
  John Appezzato, Corzine:  N.J. Should Establish Same-Sex Marriage “Sooner Rather Than Later,” NJ.COM, 
Dec. 10, 2008, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2008/12/corzine_nj_should_establish_sa.html. 
14
 Id. 
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January 7, 2010, and newly-elected Republican Governor Chris Christie took office shortly 
thereafter on January 19.
15
  Governor Christie has openly opposed same-sex marriage, stating 
that marriage should remain between a man and a woman.
16
  In the wake of the amendment’s 
defeat, six of the plaintiffs from Lewis v. Harris returned to the New Jersey Supreme Court on 
March 18, 2010, arguing that the Legislature had failed to comply with Lewis’s order.17  
However, while the fate of same-sex marriage now rests once again in the hands of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, Governor Christie has a very real opportunity to stack the bench and deny 
equal rights to same-sex couples for another four years or more.
18
 
This paper argues that while a separate institution can never truly equal traditional 
marriage, politics may ultimately have more of an impact on same-sex marriage than the law 
itself.  Part I reviews the Lewis decision, the enactment of the Civil Union Act, and the 
subsequent findings of the Commission.  Part II analyzes arguments on both sides of the same-
sex marriage divide, ultimately concluding that separate but parallel statutory schemes cannot 
confer the same benefits and responsibilities as marriage.  Part III discusses the current members 
of the New Jersey Supreme Court, including Governor Christie’s potential impact on the 
structure of the bench, and addresses the possible influence that the Commission’s report will 
                                                          
15
 David Kocieniewski, New Jersey Senate Defeats Gay Marriage Bill, NY TIMES, Jan. 8, 2010 at A18, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/08/nyregion/08trenton.html. 
16
 Christ Christie, Shared Values, Chris Christie Governor, http://christiefornj.com/issues/shared-values.html  (last 
visited May 3, 2010) (“I...believe marriage should be exclusively between one man and one woman….  If a bill 
legalizing same sex marriage came to my desk as Governor, I would veto it. If the law were changed by judicial fiat, 
I would be in favor of a constitutional amendment on the ballot so that voters, not judges, would decide this 
important social question.”). 
17
 Lambda Legal,  Lambda Legal Returns to New Jersey Supreme Court Seeking Marriage Equality, Mar. 18 2010, 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/xnj_20100318_lambda-returns-nj.html.  The Lewis v. Harris Plaintiffs were 
(and continue to be) aided and funded by Lambda Legal and Garden State Equality.  Id.  The motion will be made 
directly to the New Jersey Supreme Court because a motion in aid of litigants’ rights must be filed “before the court 
that issued that order, here the Supreme Court.”).  Asbury Park Bd. of Educ. v. New Jersey Dept. of Educ., 369 N.J. 
Super. 481, 487 (App. Div. 2004). 
18
 Tom Howell Jr., Christie Could Reshape State Court, NJ HERALD, Nov. 8, 2009, available at 
http://www.njherald.com/story/news/08SIDEBAR.   
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have on a challenge to the Lewis holding.  Ultimately, this paper concludes by analyzing how 
changes in the court are likely to have an impact on the future of same-sex marriage.   
Part I:  Lewis v. Harris and New Jersey’s Failed Compromise 
In Lewis v. Harris, the Plaintiffs were seven same-sex couples who had been in 
committed relationships for over ten years.
19
  Each couple was denied a marriage license by the 
state, and the couples ultimately joined together to challenge the constitutionality of New 
Jersey’s marriage statutes.20  After suing at the trial level, the trial judge granted summary 
judgment on the State’s behalf and a divided Appellate Division affirmed.21  The Appellate 
Division concluded that New Jersey’s marriage laws do not violate substantive due process or 
equal protection, and opined that it was the true province of the Legislature to determine whether 
relief should be provided.
22
  In a partial victory for marriage equality advocates, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that denying same-sex couples the rights and benefits of marriage violated 
New Jersey’s equal protection clause.23  However, rather than requiring the state of New Jersey 
to allow same-sex couples to marry, the court concluded that the Legislature could rectify the 
constitutional error by amending the state’s existing marriage laws or creating a parallel statutory 
structure designed to provide the same rights and benefits.
24
   
The court first dealt with the Plaintiffs’ due process challenge and disappointingly 
concluded that because there was no fundamental right at issue, there was no constitutional 
                                                          
19
  Lewis, 908 A.2d at 200-202.  The Court presented moving details about each of the couples, including one couple 
who had been together for fourteen years, who had both officiated at weddings and signed marriage certificates, yet 
could not have their relationship sanctioned under New Jersey law.  
20
  Id. 
21
  Id. at 203-05. 
22
  Id. 
23
   Lewis, 908 A.2d at 203-05. 
24
  Id. at 200.  
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violation.
25
  However, the court then moved to the Plaintiffs’ equal protection argument and 
found that the marriage laws violated the State’s constitution.26  The court looked to three factors 
to determine whether a violation had occurred:  the nature of the right, the extent to which the 
right was restricted by the marriage laws, and the public need for such restrictions.
27
  Notably, 
the court analyzed the first factor by again framing the issue quite narrowly.
28
  The court asked 
two distinct questions:  first, whether same-sex couples had a right to the statutory benefits 
conferred on opposite-sex couples by the state of marriage, and second, whether that right also 
entailed a right to the name of marriage itself.
29
  Next, the court analyzed the second factor and 
concluded that while New Jersey had attempted to combat discrimination based on sexual 
orientation in a number of different ways, the Domestic Partnership Act “failed to bridge the 
inequality gap” between opposite- and same-sex couples in several significant ways.30   
Finally, the court analyzed the third factor by examining the state’s interests.31  The court 
first noted that the State had not successfully made any arguments concerning heterosexual 
couples creating the optimal family setting for children, and found that to the contrary, 
                                                          
25
  Id. at 206-211 (holding that despite the “tolerance and goodness” of New Jersey’s citizens, the Plaintiffs could 
not establish that the right to same-sex marriage was deeply rooted in the traditions and history of the State); contra  
id. at 227-29 (Poritz, J., dissenting) (“I would hold that plaintiffs have a liberty interest in civil marriage that cannot 
be withheld by the State”), and In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 431 (holding that the right to marriage is a 
fundamental right regardless of sex, and noting that had the issue been so narrowly framed in the case of interracial 
marriage, no such right would exist); and  
26
  Id. at 211. 
27
  Id. at 212. New Jersey’s Equal Protection test differs from its federal counterpart under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, which applies one of three tiers of review (strict, intermediate, or rational 
basis scrutiny) depending on whether the issue involves a fundamental right or protected class.  Id. n.13. 
28
  Lewis, 908 A.2d at 212-15. 
29
  Id. 
30
  See Lewis v. Harris for a litany of rights denied to same-sex couples by the Domestic Partnership Act including 
the right to change one’s surname without petitioning the court, certain automatic property rights, a variety of 
benefits, and family law protections.  Id. at 215-16.  These differences resulted in financial inequalities that were 
borne by both the couples and their children.  Id. at 216.  Lastly, despite the fact that Domestic Partnerships afford 
less protections, they are subject to more rigid entry requirements.  Id. at 216.  
31
 Id. at 216-20. 
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encouraging monogamy strengthened any family, whether opposite- or same-sex.
32
  The court 
then dismissed the State’s second argument regarding uniformity with other state marriage 
laws,
33
 finding that New Jersey’s protective stance on sexual orientation placed it in the company 
of more liberal states that had extended the benefits and privilege of marriage to same-sex 
couples.
34
  In making this finding, the court noted that the equal rights guarantee of the State 
constitution protected not only the rights of the majority, but also “the rights of the disfavored 
and disadvantaged.”35  Finally, the court held that the Legislature had two options:  either amend 
the marriage laws, or create a separate but parallel statutory structure.
36
  Disappointingly, they 
declined to consider whether the difference in names would present a constitutional violation.
37
  
The Legislature responded by enacting the Civil Union Act,
38
 which established civil 
unions for same-sex couples effective February 19, 2007,
39
 and establishing the New Jersey Civil 
Union Review Commission to evaluate the efficacy of the enactment.
40
  The intent of the Civil 
Union Act was to follow the court’s mandate by providing all the benefits and responsibilities of 
marriage to same-sex couples through a parallel statutory structure.
41
  Among their duties, the 
Commission was charged with determining whether additional protections were needed, 
                                                          
32
 Id. at 217. 
33
  Lewis, 908 A.2d at 218 (arguing that New Jersey should refuse to honor same-sex relationships because the 
majority of other states had done so). 
34
  Id. 218-20. 
35
  Id. at 220. 
36
  Id. at 220-23 (mandating that the Legislature must respond within 180 days). 
37
  Id. at 221-22. (“Because this State has no experience with a civil union construct…we will not speculate that 
identical schemes called by different names would create a distinction that would offend Article I, Paragraph 1. We 
will not presume that a difference in name alone is of constitutional magnitude.”). 
38
  Civil Union Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1-28 (e)-(f) (West 2010). 
39
  Id. 
40
  §§ 37:1-36 (a), (c)(1)-(7). 
41
  New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission, supra note 7, at 3; § 37:1-28 (e)-(f). 
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evaluating how civil unions were treated by other states and jurisdictions,
42
 evaluating the 
separate structure’s impact on same-sex couples and their children, and evaluating the financial 
impact of the separate statutory structure on the state of New Jersey.
43
  The Commission heard 
testimony from same-sex couples and their families, advocacy organizations on both sides of the 
divide, and experts in psychology, social work, finance, law, and statistics.
44
 
The Commission issued its final report on December 10, 2008, and concluded that by 
enacting a separate statutory structure, the Legislature had failed to extend the benefits and 
responsibilities of marriage to same-sex couples.
45
  It found that despite the court’s mandate that 
same-sex couples receive the benefits and privileges of marriage, there were several tangible 
differences in how married and civil unioned couples were treated.
46
  In addition, it noted that 
since the Civil Union Act’s enactment, a number of marriage equality developments had taken 
place in New Jersey’s more liberal sister states.47 
The Commission found that there were several economic harms in denying same-sex 
couples the right to marry.
48
  First, both self-insured companies
49
 and employers who provide 
benefits through unionized collective bargaining agreements
50
 are able to deny providing the 
                                                          
42
  The Commission also looked at International laws.  New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission, supra note 7, 
at 37.  They found that Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, and Spain allow same-sex 
marriage and Great Britain, New Zealand, Iceland, and Sweden offer parallel statutory structures.  Id. 
43
  New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission, supra note 7, at 5. 
44
  Id.  
45
  Id. at 3.  
46
  Id. at 5-6.  
47
  Id. at 6-7.  National advancements included the California Supreme Court’s holding that excluding same-sex 
couples from marriage was unconstitutional, passage of Proposition 8 denying same-sex couples the right to marry, 
Massachusetts’ repeal of a law which prohibited non-resident couples (both opposite- and same-sex) from marrying 
in Massachusetts if their marriage would be void in their home state, and the Connecticut Supreme Court’s holding 
that excluding same-sex couples from the full rights, responsibilities, and name of marriage violated the state’s equal 
protection guarantees.  Id. 
48
  New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission, supra note 7, at 25-28.  
49
  Id. at 11. 
50
  Id. at 12. 
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same benefits to employees’ civil union partners that they extend to marital spouses.51  Under the 
federal Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act (“ERISA”), both employers who create 
their own insurance plans and employers who provide insurance through collective bargaining 
agreements are governed by the federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).52  DOMA provides 
that any federal statute or regulation that grants benefits to spouses only applies to marriages 
between one man and one woman,
53
 and employers therefore have the option of choosing 
whether or not to grant benefits to civil union partners.
54
  An employer’s choice not to provide 
benefits, whether that choice is made because of discriminatory beliefs or financial 
considerations, will be sanctioned by the government.
55
 
In the majority of cases for self-insured companies, the Commission received testimony 
that employers were using the federal loophole to deny benefits to same-sex partners as a form of 
cost-savings.
56
  For unionized companies, unions have increasingly bargained away health and 
pension benefits for civil union partners to protect the majority.
57
  Even more disturbingly, an 
employer’s failure to provide benefits under ERISA might in fact encourage couples to dissolve 
their unions by putting an entire couple’s estate at risk in the event of an injury.58  Additionally, 
the Commission received testimony that a further economic burden was created by the necessity 
of obtaining legal representation due to discrimination.
59
  However, evidence from New Jersey’s 
                                                          
51
  Id. at 11-12. 
52
  Id. 
53
  Federal Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2010) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of 
any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the 
word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 
"spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”). 
54
  New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission, supra note 7, at 11. 
55
  Id. 
56
  Id. 
57
  Id. at 12-13. 
58
  Id. at 12 (nurse testifying to the fact that she had seriously considered dissolving her civil union due to the 
potential financial impact on her estate). 
59
  New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission, supra note 7, at 13-14. 
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sister state Massachusetts (which began allowing same-sex couples to marry in 2004) indicated 
that enacting same-sex marriage laws would provide a partial remedy to the ERISA loophole by 
refusing to mask employers’ discriminatory practices behind convenient statutory distinctions.60  
The stigma of discriminating against homosexuals in same-sex marriages would encourage many 
employers to provide equal benefits.
61
 
The Commission also found that same-sex couples received shockingly unequal 
treatment regarding access to healthcare.
62
  Hospital employees and other healthcare providers 
had refused to honor requests that partners be consulted in the event of medical emergencies, had 
refused admission to civil union partners during visiting hours, and had even refused to allow 
partners to make final arrangements for their deceased spouses.
63
  Additionally, despite the 
dictates of the Civil Union Act, couples had difficulty obtaining healthcare for both partners.
64
  
Perhaps the greatest burden was that same-sex couples confronted these obstacles in times of 
crisis, when no person should be forced to explain the technicalities of his or her relationship.
65
  
As one witness stated during the proceedings, “marriage is…the coin of the realm,” and carries 
with it a universally understood meaning.
66
  Civil unions do not carry the same weight, and many 
unionized couples have been forced to explain their status in order to receive the same 
treatment.
67
 
                                                          
60
  Id. at 21 (“ERISA-covered employers in Massachusetts … understand that without the term ‘civil union’ or 
‘domestic partner’ to hide behind, if they don’t give equal benefits to employees in same-sex marriages, these 
employers would have to come forth with the real excuse for discrimination.  And employers in a progressive state 
like Massachusetts are loathe to do that, as they would be in a similarly progressive state like New Jersey.”). 
61
  Id. 
62
  Id. at 14-15. 
63
  Id. 
64
  Id. 
65
  New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission, supra note 7, at 14-15. 
66
  Id. at 9. 
67
  Id. 
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The Commission also found that there were intangible differences that had a devastating 
psychological impact upon same-sex unionized couples, their families, and the homosexual 
population as a whole.
68
  Psychiatrists testified that the difference in terminology led both society 
and the couples to question their own legitimacy.
69
  The Commission found that because 
marriage indicates society’s acceptance of a couple, refusing to allow same-sex couples to marry 
stigmatizes homosexuality and encourages society to treat same-sex couples as having an inferior 
status.
 70
  This stigma has a detrimental impact on the mental well-being of homosexual 
population as a whole.
71
  As one psychiatrist testified, “Nothing is more basic from a mental 
health perspective to happiness and liberty than the right to love another human being with the 
same privileges and responsibilities as everyone else.”72  This stigma further traumatizes our 
youth because it extends to both young homosexuals and the children of same-sex couples.
73
 
In addition to testimony in favor of same-sex marriage, the Commission also heard from 
marriage-equality opponents.
74
  One common argument was simply that marriage should remain 
between a man and a woman, consistent with the history and origins of the word.
75
  One 
opponent argued that marriage had a transcendent meaning to society beyond the legal institution 
itself, and that children were better off raised in a traditional family.
76
  Other witnesses further 
argued that marriage is derived from biblical teachings, and that the state should not sanction 
                                                          
68
  Id. at 15-20. 
69
  Id. at 16. 
70
  Id. 
71
  New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission, supra note 7, at 16. 
72
  Id. 
73
  The Commission also noted that children faced the stigma of being viewed as bastards, or children of unmarried 
couples.  Id. at 16-17.  Additionally, young homosexuals faced the pain of not being able to envision marriage in 
their futures.  Id. at 18. 
74
  Id. at 39-41. 
75
  Id. at 39. 
76
  New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission, supra note 7, at 39. 
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same-sex couples’ lifestyle choices.77  Witnesses expressed skepticism with the notion that the 
Civil Union Act was an insufficient remedy, and even argued that amending marriage laws 
would create a backlash that would ultimately do more harm than good.
78
  These witnesses felt 
that the fate of same-sex marriage should be left to the voters, rather than the courts or the 
Legislature.
79
  Despite this testimony, the Commission concluded that amending marriage laws 
would provide an appropriate remedy for the tangible and intangible shortfalls of civil unions, 
would enhance New Jersey’s economy, and enhance recognition of same-sex couples’ unions in 
other states and jurisdictions.
80
 
The Commission’s final report details a history of discrimination against same-sex 
couples.  Despite the creation of civil unions, or maybe even because of them, the discrimination 
continues.  And despite the dictates of Lewis, civil unions do not extend equal rights to same-sex 
couples.  The Commission’s report is evidence that the New Jersey Legislature has failed to 
comply with a court order, and the Lewis Plaintiffs are returning to court to compel the state to 
do what it has promised.
81
  However, while the simplest solution would be to amend the 
marriage laws, same-sex marriage is one topic that is frequently more driven by morality and 
politics than love or law.   
Part II:  Why Separate Can Never Be Equal 
The Commission did not give much credit to opponents’ arguments that marriage should 
remain between a man and a woman, but these arguments have had better luck in many other 
                                                          
77
  Id. at 40 
78
  Id. 
79
  Id. at 41. 
80
  Id. at 25.  One study found that not only would extending marriage to same-sex couples not result in increased 
costs to the state, but doing so could in fact boost state and local revenues by approximately $19 million dollars over 
the next three years, and spending on weddings and tourism could boost the New Jersey economy by approximately 
$248 million over three years and create or sustain over 800 new jobs.  Id. at 27, 48. 
81
  See Part III infra. 
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states and jurisdictions.  Should New Jersey pass a law allowing same-sex marriage, it would be 
in limited company.  Currently, only five states and one federal district allow same-sex 
marriage.
82
  Unfortunately, the majority of states have adopted versions of the Federal Defense 
of Marriage Act, which defines marriage as a union between a man and a woman.
83
  Although an 
amendment to the United States Constitution prohibiting same-sex marriage was ultimately 
defeated in 2006,
84
 thirty states have passed state amendments.
85
   
Although the United States Supreme Court may find itself revisiting the issue in the near 
future,
86
 the only precedent currently from the Court is a thirty-eight year old case by the name 
of Baker v. Nelson.
87
  In Baker, Plaintiffs appealed a Minnesota state law limiting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples as a violation of their 9
th
 and 14
th
 Amendment rights.
88
  Their appeal was 
dismissed “for want of a substantial federal question” on mandatory appellate review, and 
therefore the dismissal was a decision on the merits of the case.
89
  The state court’s decision 
finding that the statute was not unconstitutional is binding federal precedent.
90
 
Despite the New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission’s failure to credit the argument 
that marriage is traditionally a union between a man and a woman, many courts are not so quick 
                                                          
82
  Same-sex marriages are allowed in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, and 
Washington D.C..  Wikipedia, Same Sex Marriage In the United States,  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same-
sex_marriage_in_the_United_States#cite_ref-Adams_.26_Crary_11-03-2009_5-2 (last visited May 3, 2010). 
83
  William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Nan D. Hunter, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 1078 (2d. ed. 2004). 
84
  Wikipedia, Same Sex Marriage in the United States, supra note 81. 
85
  William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Nan D. Hunter, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW SUPPLEMENT 129-30 (2d. ed. 
2004). 
86
  Margaret Talbot, A Risky Proposal, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 18 2010, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/01/18/100118fa_fact_talbot. 
87
  Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). 
88
  Plaintiffs argued that the statutes abridged their fundamental right to marry under the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause, discriminated based on gender contrary to the Equal Protection Clause (also Fourteenth 
Amendment), and deprived them of privacy rights flowing from the Ninth Amendment (311-315) 
89
 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (U.S. 1972). 
90
 Peter Hay, Civil Law, Procedure, and Private International Law:  Recognition of Same-Sex Legal Relationships in 
the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 269 (2006) (“A dismissal may or may not be on the merits and constitute 
a precedent. Procedural dismissals are not on the merits. The dismissal in Baker, however, had to consider the issue 
to arrive at the reason for the dismissal.”). 
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to discount the value of tradition.  In Singer v. Hara, a Washington state case that followed 
quickly on the heels of Baker, the court found that banning same-sex marriage does not violate 
equal rights guarantees.
91
  In order to reach that conclusion, the court first succinctly found that 
“marriage” in the legal sense simply refers to “the legal union of one man and one woman.”92  
They therefore found that appellants were not being denied the right to marry on the basis of 
their sex, but instead simply did not fit the traditional definition of marriage.
93
  The court quoted 
Jones v. Hallahan, another state case decided in 1973, when it noted that "[i]n substance, the 
relationship proposed by the appellants does not authorize the issuance of a marriage license 
because what they propose is not a marriage."
94
 
Contrary to the Commission, courts have also accepted the argument that the union of 
marriage is also inextricably linked with the act of procreation and child rearing.
95
    According 
to the Singer court, the act of procreation is the primary reason for the institution of marriage, 
despite “exceptional situations” where heterosexual couples do not have children due to choice 
or sterility, and therefore the refusal of the state to allow same-sex marriage “results  from…[the] 
impossibility of reproduction rather than from an invidious discrimination.”96  The court noted 
that the institution of marriage itself is clearly related to creating a favorable environment for 
children.
97
  It followed, therefore, that because marriage is a union between a man and a woman, 
opposite-sex couples must create more favorable environments for the purposes of child 
                                                          
91
  Singer v. Hara, 11 Wn. App. 247 (1974). 
92
  Id. at 253.  
93
  Id. at 254-55. 
94
  Id at 255 (quoting Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1973)). 
95
  See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 363-65 (2006); but compare In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 431 
(arguing that because Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) established the fundamental right to for marital 
couples to use contraceptives, the institution of marriage must be about more than furthering procreation). 
96
  Singer, 11 Wn. App. at 259-260. 
97
  Id. 
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rearing.
98
  And in a truly bizarre argument, New York’s Court of Appeals has found that because 
same-sex couples are less likely to have accidental pregnancies, they do not need the protections 
of marriage.
99
 
Finally, courts have also accepted the argument that the institution of marriage is rooted 
in religious morality and that to extend it to same-sex couples is somehow to corrupt its original 
meaning.  In Adams v. Howerton, an early 9
th
 circuit case, the court held that a same-sex partner 
is not a spouse under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
100
  In so holding, the court noted that 
marriage was based on common law, which in turn was derived from Judeo-Christian 
morality.
101
  Because Judeo-Christian morality would not have sanctioned same-sex marriage,
102
 
to allow same-sex spouses under the Immigration and Nationality Act would corrupt the very 
societal values protected by the institution.
103
 
Still, separate institutions such as civil unions are an insufficient remedy because despite 
the best efforts of the states that provide them, a separate institution can never confer truly equal 
rights and benefits.  In Lewis v. Harris, the 2006 New Jersey Supreme Court pointedly included 
itself in the company of more liberal states like Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Vermont, 
concluding that the state constitution guaranteed equality of treatment regardless of one’s 
                                                          
98
  Id. 
99
  Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d at 359. (“It is more important to promote stability…in opposite-sex than in same-sex 
relationships.  Heterosexual intercourse has a natural tendency to lead to the birth of children; homosexual 
intercourse does not.”). This argument is bizarre because it turns on its head the traditional notion that marriage is 
about the celebration of commitment, and instead argues that marriage is an inducement for those who are not really 
committed but who might accidentally procreate.  The court has also refused to accept studies that show there are no 
marked differences between children raised by same-sex couples and children raised in traditional family structures.  
Id. at 360. 
100
  Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff’d, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
101
  Id. at 1123. 
102
  Id. 
103
  Id. (“If one is to articulate the federal public policy involved and the reasons for refusing to recognize that a 
"marriage" can exist between two people of the same sex, one ought to explore the societal values which underlie 
the recognition of marriage and the reasons that it has been a preferred and protected legal institution.”). 
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sexuality.
104
  All of these states now allow same-sex couples to partake not only in the benefits 
and responsibilities of marriage, but in the name of marriage itself.
105
   
Of these states, Massachusetts has made tremendously important contributions by 
pioneering marriage equality and abolishing the notion that a separate statutory structure can 
ever equal the union of marriage.  In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, a 2003 
decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that limiting marriage to heterosexual couples 
was unconstitutional and became the first state in America to recognize same-sex marriage.
106
  
Following Goodridge, the Senate prepared and drafted a bill which would establish civil unions 
for same-sex couples in lieu of marriage.
107
  In an advisory opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court advised the state legislature that the bill would violate the equal protection and 
due process requirements of the state Constitution and Declaration of Rights.
108
   
Importantly, like the New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission,
109
 the justices 
highlighted the tangible and intangible rights of marriage, and concluded that the same 
deficiencies that made the pre-Goodridge marriage ban unconstitutional were actually 
exacerbated by any attempt to create a separate statutory structure.
110
  The Justices opined that 
differences between the two institutions were more than mere semantics.  Instead, to create a 
separate statutory structure would stigmatize homosexuality and relegate same-sex couples to a 
                                                          
104
  New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission, supra note 7, at 456-57.  (“Vermont, Massachusetts, and 
Connecticut represent a distinct minority view. Nevertheless, our current laws concerning same-sex couples are 
more in line with the legal constructs in those states than the majority of other states.”). 
105
  See discussion infra Part II. 
106
  Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003).  In so holding, the Court rejected the 
Department’s arguments that heterosexual marriages provided the best setting for procreation and child rearing, and 
were necessary to preserve the State’s financial resources.  Id. at 961-64. 
107
  Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (2004). 
108
  Id. at 566, 72. 
109
  See supra Part I. 
110
  Id. at 569. 
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second-class status.
111
  Ultimately, the Justices found that creating a distinction could not 
possibly be found to advance the state interests asserted in Goodridge,
112
 stating that “no amount 
of tinkering with language will eradicate that stain.”113  In so finding, the Justices symbolically 
linked the struggle of same-sex couples with that of African Americans during the civil rights 
movement by citing Brown v. Board of Education for the proposition that a separate but parallel 
scheme is rarely equal.
114
  The bill was never passed, and despite opposition, same-sex marriage 
continues in Massachusetts.
115
 
Though the decisions to legalize marriage came after Lewis v. Harris was decided, both 
of New Jersey’s other comparable states have also come to the conclusion that a separate 
statutory structure cannot provide the same benefits and responsibilities as traditional 
marriage.
116
  Though Vermont did not legalize marriage until 2009,
117
 the groundwork for the 
decision was laid ten years earlier when the Vermont Supreme Court held in Baker v. Vermont 
that in order to comply with the state equal protection guarantee, the Legislature was required to 
extend the benefits and protections of marriage to same-sex couples.
118
  Like New Jersey, the 
court held that the Legislature could comply with its ruling by amending marriage laws or 
                                                          
111
  Id. at 570. 
112
  Id. at 569 (“Segregating same-sex unions from opposite-sex unions cannot possibly be held rationally to advance 
or "preserve" what we stated in Goodridge were the Commonwealth's legitimate interests in procreation, child 
rearing, and the conservation of resources.”). 
113
  Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 570. 
114
  Id. at 569 n.3 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)) (“The history of our nation has 
demonstrated that separate is seldom, if ever, equal.”). 
115
  The most recent movement for a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage was defeated in June 2007.  Frank 
Phillips, Legislators Vote to Defeat Same-Sex Marriage Ban, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 2007, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/city_region/breaking_news/2007/06/legislators_vot_1.html.  Then Governor 
Deval Patrick stated, "Whenever we affirm the equality of anyone, we affirm the equality of everyone."  Id.   
116
  See supra note 87, where the court compared New Jersey to Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Vermont. 
117
  Alan Silverleib, Vermont Senate Votes to Legalize Same-sex Marriage, CNN.com, Mar. 23, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/03/23/vermont.samesex.marriage/index.html.  
118
 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
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creating a separate institution.
119
  And like New Jersey, the legislature decided on a parallel 
statutory scheme and Vermont began granting civil union status to same-sex couples in 2000.
120
  
In July 2007, the Vermont Commission on Family Recognition and Protection was appointed to 
study whether Vermont should allow same-sex marriage instead of civil unions.
121
  Like New 
Jersey’s Civil Union Review Commission, Vermont found that there were several tangible and 
intangible benefits that were reserved for heterosexual couples who were legally married.
122
  
Ultimately, a bill to legalize same-sex marriage was introduced in February 2009, and Vermont 
became the first state to legalize marriage by legislative action effective September 1, 2009.
123
 
Unlike Vermont, Connecticut legalized marriage by way of court order after determining 
that civil unions could not afford the same rights and benefits as same-sex marriage.  One year 
before New Jersey’s Lewis v. Harris was decided in 2006, Connecticut became the second state 
following Vermont to adopt civil unions.
124
  In 2008, however, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
held in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health that failing to allow same-sex couples the 
right to marry violated the state’s equal protection clause because it discriminated on the basis of 
sexual orientation which, like gender, was a quasi-suspect classification.
125
  In so holding, the 
court found that the institution of marriage had an intangible status and significance that could 
not be replicated by a parallel statutory scheme, and further found that homosexuals had been 
                                                          
119
  Id. 
120
  Wikipedia, Same Sex Marriage In Vermont, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same-sex_marriage_in_Vermont (last 
visited May 3, 2010).  
121
  Vermont Civil Union Review Commission, REPORT OF THE VERMONT CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMMISSION 1 
(2001), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/baker/cureport.htm. 
122
  While the Vermont Commission declined to make an ultimate recommendation regarding whether or not the 
state should grant same-sex couples marriage licenses, they did find that some intangibles included the terminology 
of marriage, its social culture, and its historical significance.  Id. at 26-29.  Tangibles included recognition by other 
jurisdictions.  Id. 
123
  Abby Goodnough, Gay Rights Groups Celebrate Victories in Marriage Push, NY TIMES, April 7, 2009 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/us/08vermont.html?_r=.     
124
 Wikipedia, Same Sex Marriage in Connecticut, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same-
sex_marriage_in_Connecticut#cite_note-8 (last visited May 3, 2010). 
125
  Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 411 (Conn. 2008). 
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subjected to a history of “pernicious discrimination” that would only be continued by refusing to 
allow them to marry.
126
 
Though the New Jersey Lewis court did not mention it in its discussion of the more 
liberal states, California has also been at the forefront of the discussion regarding whether 
offering a parallel statutory scheme like civil unions can ever truly equal the institution of 
marriage.  In 2008, the California Supreme Court decided In re Marriage Cases and held that 
limiting marriage to same-sex couples violated the state constitution.
127
  The case is an important 
decision in the body of the same-sex marriage cases because California became the first court to 
find that marriage was a fundamental right,
128
 and became the first state to apply strict scrutiny to 
classifications made on the basis of sexual orientation.
129
  Among the many arguments dismissed 
by the court, the majority rejected the notion that the state’s Domestic Partnership Act could 
satisfy same-sex couples’ constitutional marriage rights.130  Despite the fact that the Act provided 
virtually all of the same legal benefits and duties, the court held that marriage was about more 
than benefits and duties.
131
  Instead, the name of marriage gave legal recognition to a couple’s 
union and afforded it dignity, respect, and stature.
132
  The court argued that this historic 
                                                          
126
  Id.  (“We conclude that, in light of the history of pernicious discrimination faced by gay men and lesbians, and 
because the institution of marriage carries with it a status and significance that the newly created classification of 
civil unions does not embody, the segregation of heterosexual and homosexual couples into separate institutions 
constitutes a cognizable harm.”). 
127
  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 446. 
128
  Id. at 427. 
129
  In holding that the right to marry was a fundamental right regardless of gender, the court noted that America’s 
judicial history of asking whether same-sex marriage was a part of our traditions was disingenuous, because in no 
other marriage debate had the question been so narrowly phrased.  Id. at 420-21.  Instead, the court noted that in 
cases dealing with interracial marriages, the right in question had been the right to marry a person of one’s choosing, 
not the right to marry a person of another race.  Id.   
130
  Id. at 444-47 (finding that only offering same-sex couples the institution of domestic partnership impinged upon 
their respect and dignity because the term marriage was historical and symbolic, a separate statutory structure 
increased the risk of discrimination, and domestic partnerships are not well understood by the public). 
131
  Id. 
132
  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 434-35. 
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foundation was at the core of the very right, itself, and could not be recreated under a parallel 
statutory scheme.
133
 
Unfortunately and despite the support of many, Californian citizens fought back by 
constitutional amendment and overrode the court by popular initiative.
134
  Proposition 8 stated 
that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California,” and was 
passed by a narrow 52.3 to 47.7% margin.
135
  However, the court subsequently held that any 
same-sex marriages that had taken place prior to the amendment would be valid, and the decision 
has also spurred a federal challenge that may permanently alter the landscape of traditional 
marriage laws.
136
  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, a constitutional challenge to the validity of 
Proposition 8 currently before the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California, is almost certain to make its way to the United States Supreme Court, whose decision, 
good or bad, will bind the entire nation.
137
  
In summary, many of the courts and legislators who have favorably addressed the issue 
of same-sex marriage have rested their decisions on a variety of different holdings, rationales, 
and beliefs.  However, all courts that have ruled favorably on the issue of same-sex marriage 
                                                          
133
  Id.  
134
  Eskridge & Hunter, supra note 84, at 60.  Opponents’ main argument to same-sex marriage was not only that 
marriage was being forced onto Californian citizens, but also that it was being forced onto children, as well, who 
would be taught that same-sex marriage was the same (and therefore just as acceptable) as heterosexual marriage.  
Id.   
135
  Id.  The validity of the constitutional amendment was later upheld by the same court that decided the In Re 
Marriage Cases in Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal.4
th
 364 (2009) (holding that Proposition 8 was a constitutional 
amendment rather than a revision, and that therefore the change was lawfully adopted through the state’s initiative 
process). 
136
  See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7492 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal in 
challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 8 and denying a petition for a writ of mandamus). 
137
  Margaret Talbot, A Risky Proposal, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 18 2010, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/01/18/100118fa_fact_talbot.  While some hail Perry v. Schwarzenegger 
as a potential landmark case, many LGBT activist groups contend that state-by-state attacks are far more effective.  
Chuleenan Svetvilas, Challenging Prop 8: The Hidden Story, CALIFORNIA LAWYER MAGAZINE, Jan. 2010, available 
at http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=906575&evid=1.  For an interesting look at the challenge to 
Proposition 8, the argument behind the notion that the fight for same-sex marriage has been hijacked by Hollywood, 
and the argument that a federal challenge will ultimately harm the cause, see id. 
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agree that there is more to marriage than a body of rights and responsibilities.  In addition to the 
tangible benefits of marriage, there are intangible benefits that simply cannot be replicated by a 
parallel statutory structure.  Therefore, to deny same-sex couples the opportunity to marry is to 
deny them equal treatment in the eyes of both the law and society. 
Part III:  How Politics May Affect the Future of Marriage-Equality in New Jersey 
 New Jersey’s same-sex battle began in the courtroom with Lewis v. Harris, and may end 
unfavorably there as well.
138
  In the wake of the Commission’s findings that civil unions did not 
confer equal rights to same-sex couples, a bill legalizing same-sex marriage was sent to the State 
Senate.
139
  However, the measure was ultimately defeated on January 7, 2010, in a 20 to 14 
vote.
140
  While then-Democrat Governor Jon Corzine had promised that he would sign a bill if it 
was passed, Corzine was replaced on January 19, 2010 by Republican Governor Christopher 
Christie.
141
  Governor Christie based part of his election platform on preserving traditional values 
and has publically opposed same-sex marriage.
142
  Not only would Governor Christie have final 
veto power over any bill that passed his desk during his tenure, but he also has a unique and 
potentially devastating opportunity to shape the face of New Jersey law.
143
  At least four seats on 
the New Jersey Supreme Court will be at stake during Christie’s tenure, one due to mandatory 
retirement and three due to reappointment after completion of their terms.
144
  Christie’s 
opportunity to appoint four new justices to the bench has the potential to alter the existing 
                                                          
138
  David Kocieniewski, New Jersey Senate Defeats Gay Marriage Bill, NY TIMES, January 8, 2010, A18, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/08/nyregion/08trenton.html. 
139
  Id. 
140
  Id. 
141
  Id. 
142
  Id.  See also Chris Christie Governor, “Shared Values”, supra note 16. 
143
  Tom Howell Jr., Christie Could Reshape State Court, NJ HERALD, November 8, 2009, available at 
http://www.njherald.com/story/news/08SIDEBAR. 
144
  See discussion infra Part III. 
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balance of the New Jersey Supreme Court and further bury the issue of same-sex marriage for 
another four years or more. 
 On March 18, 2010, six of the plaintiffs from Lewis v. Harris returned to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court with a motion in aid of litigants’ rights, arguing that the Legislature had failed to 
comply with the court-ordered equality promised to same-sex couples in 2006.
145
  Plaintiffs rely 
heavily on the findings of the Commission, a group ironically created by the very same 
Legislature that may now potentially be overridden by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
146
  The 
Plaintiffs argue that same-sex couples lack equal workplace benefits and protections, recognition 
from the public, and equal family law protections.
147
  Additionally, they argue that same-sex 
couples and their children suffer unfair financial burdens, and that both same-sex couples and 
their children are harmed psychologically by the separate status and unequal treatment.
148
  The 
Plaintiffs are seeking amendment of the marriage laws as an enforcement of Lewis’s 2006 
judgment.  They argue that at the very least the court should appoint a Special Master to evaluate 
the Legislature’s compliance and make independent fact-findings about whether civil unions 
give same-sex couples equal rights.
149
  
 As noted above, Plaintiffs are using a motion in aid of litigants’ rights as the vehicle to 
demand same-sex marriage, and urge that the court is required to act when compliance with New 
Jersey’s constitution is at stake.150   Plaintiffs draw from a body of cases dealing with various 
                                                          
145
  See supra note 17. 
146
  Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion in Aid of Litigants’ Rights at 71, Lewis v. Harris, No. 58,389 (A.2d Mar. 
18, 2010), available at http://data.lambdalegal.org/in-court/downloads/lewis_nj_20100318_brief-iso-plaintiffs-
motion-in-aid-of-litigants-rights.pdf (“Because the Legislature has ignored the findings and refused to follow the 
recommendations of the very Commission it created in order to assure compliance with Lewis, it is now plain that 
enforcement of the constitutional mandate can only be effected by this Court.”). 
147
  Id. at 24-48. 
148
  Id. at 49-69. 
149
  Id. at 70-87. 
150
  Id. at 72. 
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educational directives where the Legislature failed to comply with the court’s orders151 to argue 
that given the record reflected by the Commission’s report, the Legislature’s acts, and the failure 
of the Lewis plaintiffs in securing equal treatment, the State should be ordered to allow same-sex 
couples to marry.
152
  In particular, Plaintiffs argue that a line of cases dealing with declaring the 
education financing system unconstitutional
153
 are very similar to the case presented by Lewis, 
because in both situations the court mandated that the Legislature cure constitutional violations 
within a certain period of time without designating a specific remedy.
154
  However, Plaintiffs 
note that even though the Lewis court failed to require the Legislature to amend the marriage 
laws, the court did contemplate the possibility that a separate statutory structure would not 
comply with the constitutional mandate.
155
  Plaintiffs ultimately deem the Legislature’s attempts 
to create a parallel statutory structure a failed experiment, and argue that marriage laws must be 
amended without delay to rectify the error.
156
 
 Lambda Legal speculates that briefing will be completed on Plaintiffs’ motion as early as 
June 2010, and the court will hear argument shortly thereafter.
157
  However, since Lewis was 
decided in 2006, the New Jersey Supreme Court has undergone a dramatic shift.  The New 
                                                          
151
  Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion, supra note 144, at 73-75.  The brief cites Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 
(1997) (“Abbott IV”), where the court granted a motion in aid of litigants’ rights after finding that the Legislature’s 
statutory enactments in response to a court order in “Abbott III” (Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575 (1994)) were 
insufficient to cure a constitutional violation); and Abbott v. Burke, 889 A.2d 1063 (2005) (“Abbott XIV”) where 
despite the State’s “substantial effort,” the Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion after concluding that the Legislature 
had failed to comply with court orders from previous cases that identified constitutional violations.  Id. 
152
  Id. at 77-79. 
153
  Id. at 74-75 (arguing that Lewis’s failed remedy is similar to Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713 (1975) 
(“Robinson IV”), because the Robinson IV court intervened to remedy a constitutional violation where it had 
previously failed to specify a remedy in Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (1973) (“Robinson II”) and Robinson v. 
Cahill, 335 A.2d 6 (1975) (“Robinson III”)). 
154
  Id. at 74-75. 
155
  Id. at 76 (pointing out the Court’s speculation in Lewis that a separate but identical scheme might nonetheless 
offend the state constitution, and noting the “well-settled principle that separate, purportedly equal legal 
classifications may not withstand constitutional scrutiny if, in practice, they fail to deliver equal treatment.”) (citing 
Lewis, 908 A.2d at 221-22) (internal citations omitted). 
156
  Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion, supra note 144, at 75-76. 
157
  Telephone Interview with Christina Izaguirre, Lambda Legal Help Desk, Christina Izaguirre (Mar. 29, 2010).   
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Jersey Supreme Court is comprised of seven Justices who are all originally nominated by the 
Governor for an initial term of seven years.
158
  At the completion of their terms, the Governor 
may then nominate them for tenure.
159
  If a Justice is tenured, she may serve until the age of 70, 
the age of mandatory retirement. 
160
 There were four members of the Lewis majority, and three 
members of the court (Chief Justice Poritz, Justice Zazzali, and Justice Long) who concurred and 
dissented on grounds that the New Jersey state marriage laws did violate the state’s equal rights 
guarantee, but that a parallel statutory structure would not provide a sufficient remedy.
161
  While 
three members of the majority have continued to serve on the court,
162
 only one member of the 
separate concurrence and dissent currently remains.
163
  In October 2006, Chief Justice Poritz 
reached the age of mandatory retirement, and her replacement Chief Justice Zazzali reached the 
age of mandatory retirement in 2007.
164
  They have been replaced by Chief Justice Rabner, a 
Democrat, and Justice Hoens, a Republican.
165
   
 While one might think that generally, a Democrat would be more sympathetic than a 
Republican, it is difficult to predict how the change in the court’s structure will affect the 
Plaintiffs’ motion.  If Lewis’s 2006 decision is any indication, then party lines are no indication.  
Both the majority and separate concurrence and dissent included Republican and Democratic 
Justices, and every member of the court seemed to analyze the question independently of 
                                                          
158
  Wikipedia, New Jersey Supreme Court, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Jersey_Supreme_Court (last visited 
May 3, 2010). 
159
  Id. 
160
  Id. (unless the Justice dies, resigns, retires, or is impeached and removed).  Id. 
161
  Justices Albin, LaVecchia, Long, and Wallace took part in the majority.  Lewis, 908 A.2d at 200. 
162
  While Justice Wallace is currently a member of the court, his term expires on May 20, 2010 and Governor 
Christie has nominated a new candidate, Republican Anne Murray Paterson, as his replacement.  Terrence Dopp, 
Christie May be Blocked in Replacing New Jersey Justice Wallace, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 3, 2010, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-03/christie-may-be-blocked-in-replacing-new-jersey-
justice-wallace.html. 
163
  Wikipedia, New Jersey Supreme Court, supra note 156. 
164
  Id. 
165
  Id. 
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partisan alliances.
166
  As one commentator has noted, every member of the separate concurrence 
and dissent was appointed by a Republican governor, while three members of the majority 
opinion were actually appointed by a gay man, then-Governor James McGreevey.
167
   
Some analysts have urged that the court’s independence is due in part to the fact that 
many of its members have come from the state’s executive branch.168  While Republican Justice 
Hoens has served exclusively in the judicial branch,
169
 she was appointed by Democrat Jon 
Corzine and he has stated that she has the ability to decide a case based on the law, the facts, and 
the existing precedent of the court.
170
  However, Chief Justice Stuart Rabner was formerly 
Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, and has authored several advisory opinions on the 
status of civil union law in New Jersey.  While not all of Chief Justice Rabner’s opinions are 
clearly favorable to the LGBT community,
171
 several of his opinions have had the effect of 
applying and upholding Lewis’s court order.172  In one particular opinion, Chief Justice Rabner 
advised that New Jersey must recognize same-sex marriages, civil unions, and domestic 
partnerships formed in other jurisdictions without requirement of an additional in-state 
ceremony.
173
  Importantly, Chief Justice Rabner advised that the name of the relationship given 
                                                          
166
  Laura Mansnerus, Ruling on Same-sex Marriage; Party Lines are No Guide to Opinions by Justices, NY TIMES, 
Oct. 26, 2006, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9402E2DB143FF935A15753C1A9609C8B63. 
167
  Id.   
168
  Id.  When Lewis was decided in 2006, Chief Justice Poritz and Justices LaVecchia, Long, and Zazzali had all 
served in the executive branch in some capacity.  Id. 
169
  New Jersey Judiciary, Justice Helen E. Hoens, NJCourtsonline.com,   
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/supreme/hhoens.htm (last visited May 3, 2010).  Justice Hoens started in the 
Superior Court in 1994 and moved to the Appellate Division in 2002.  Id. 
170
  Mary Fuchs, N.J. Gubernatorial Candidates Address Social Issues Including Medical Marijuana, Gay Marriage, 
NJ.COM, Oct. 8, 2009, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/10/nj_gubernatorial_candidates_ad_1.html 
171
  See, e.g., 2007 Op. N.J. Att’y Gen. 3 (2007) (advising that public officials may decline to officiate at civil 
unions, though also advising that these officials must decline to officiate at opposite-sex marriages).  
172
  See id.; and 2007 Op. N.J. Att’y Gen 2 (2007) (stating that marriages, civil unions, and domestic partnerships 
performed in other jurisdictions may be recognized in New Jersey depending on the benefits and rights conferred). 
173
  2007 Op. N.J. Att’y Gen 2 (2007). 
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by another jurisdiction would not control.
174
  Instead, the state would be required to carefully 
assess the nature of the rights conferred by the other jurisdiction to determine whether the 
relationship would be deemed a civil union or a domestic partnership under New Jersey state 
law.
175
   
On one hand, this opinion hardly seems to be a positive indication of Chief Justice 
Rabner’s viewpoints, because it minimizes the importance of the designation of marriage by 
refusing to honor the name given to a relationship by another jurisdiction.  However, on the other 
hand, it shows that Chief Justice Rabner advocates carefully assessing each of the rights and 
benefits granted to a relationship, regardless of its title.  In conducting a careful weighing of the 
rights and benefits granted by marriage versus those granted by civil unions, it is possible that he 
may realize the scales fail to balance.  At the very least, Chief Justice Rabner’s opinions while 
acting as an officer of the executive branch show that he is able to independently assess an issue 
based on the legal merits of the argument.   
Regarding the other four members of the court who were originally a part of the Lewis 
decision, it is hard to determine whether they will be swayed by the Plaintiffs’ motion.  
However, many view the court as leaning more towards the moderate to liberal side of the 
political scale, particularly when it comes to civil rights issues.
176
  Even if the court shirked from 
flat-out requiring the state to amend marriage laws in Lewis, the fact that it ordered the 
Legislature to allow same-sex marriage or create a parallel statutory structure at all is an 
indication that its members are either sympathetic, or at the very least willing to apply the law 
                                                          
174
  Id. 
175
  Id. 
176
  Mary Fuchs, State Justices Have Work Cut Out for Them, NORTHJERSEY.COM, Sept. 13, 2009 , 
http://www.northjersey.com/news/State_justices_have_work_cut_out_for_them.html?c=y&page=1. 
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(rather than their own biases).
177
  This is particularly true given the fact that the court did so in 
lieu of waiting for legislative action or popular vote.   
In fact, Republicans have criticized the entire court, including members of their own 
party, as far too activist.
178
  Governor Christie has publically stated that regardless of party lines, 
none of the members on the current court have the qualities that he values in a Justice.
179
  
Christie’s views on the issue are incredibly important because he has the potential to 
dramatically alter the face of the Supreme Court bench by appointing four new justices during 
the course of his tenure.
180
  Governor Christie has already indicated that he will not reappoint 
Justice Wallace after his term expires on May 20, 2010,
181
 and Justices River-Soto and Hoens 
will be up for reappointment in 2011 and 2013 respectively.
182
  Justice Long will face mandatory 
retirement on March 1, 2012.
183
   
Historically, the court has always been balanced to include no more than four members of 
any political party, and Governor Christie has indicated that he will honor that tradition.
184
  
However, he has indicated that he would like to make some significant changes.
185
  Perhaps 
unluckily for Lewis Plaintiffs, Governor Christie has stated that his chief concern are justices 
                                                          
177
  See id. 
178
  Fuchs, Next Governor Will Reshape N.J. Supreme Court, NJ.COM, Oct. 29, 2009, 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/10/next_nj_governor_could_impact.html 
179
  Fuchs, Face of Supreme Court Lies in Next Governor’s Hands, NORTHJERSEY.COM, Oct. 29, 2009 (Governor 
Christie:  "On the New Jersey Supreme Court right now? No," he said. "I want someone who is extraordinarily 
bright, and I want someone who will interpret laws and the [state] Constitution, not legislate from the bench."). 
180
  Id. (When referring to election between Corzine and Christie:  “The next governor could remake the state 
Supreme Court by appointing as many as four justices to the seven-member panel — and loading a majority of the 
bench to suit his political philosophy.”). 
181
  Dopp, supra note 160. 
182
  Wikipedia, supra note 156.  Wallace will face reappointment on May 20, 2010, Justice Rivera-Soto on 
September 1, 2011, and Justice Hoens on October 26, 2013.  Id. 
183
 Id. 
184
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185
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who “legislate from the bench,”186 something that the original Lewis court members very 
certainly did.
187
  Governor Christie has indicated that he will not simply reappoint each justice up 
for tenure, but will instead “examin[e] their entire judicial record, determining whether they have 
been justices who faithfully interpret the law and the constitution or justices who legislate from 
the bench.”188  The Governor has expressed his outward disapproval of Republican Justice 
Rivera-Soto,
189
 and it is likely that he will be replaced when his term expires September 1, 
2011.
190
  And as noted below, given Governor Christie’s choice to decline Justice Wallace’s 
tenure even in the face of tradition and severe opposition,
191
 Justice Hoens’ removal from the 
bench seems like a foregone conclusion.  Should the court delay in deciding the Lewis Plaintiffs’ 
motion, Governor Christie’s desire to appoint justices who will defer to the Legislature could 
have an adverse impact on the motion.   
As noted above, one member of the original Lewis majority is already in limbo as a result 
of Governor Christie’s agenda.  Though there is a longstanding tradition of tenuring justices up 
for reappointment, Governor Christie has stated that he will be retiring Justice Wallace on May 
                                                          
186
  See supra note 177.  
187
  Arguably, a Court order requiring the Legislature to amend marriage laws after the Senate has very clearly 
vetoed a same-sex marriage bill would be even more forward and aggressive than the original Lewis decision, itself.   
188
  Fuchs, State Justices Have Work Cut Out for Them, supra note 174. 
189
  Fuchs, Next Governor Will Reshape NJ Supreme Court, supra note 176 (“[Christie] has also said he has serious 
concerns about Rivera-Soto’s temperament but has not indicated how, as governor, he would handle his 
reappointment.”).  Rivera-Soto was publically censured for wielding his power as a Supreme Court Justice after the 
Supreme Court Advisory Committee found that he interfered in a high school rivalry between his son and another 
football player, contacted police, prosecutors, and trial judges regarding an altercation between the two boys, and 
even insulted the boy’s father.  In the Matter of Rivera-Soto, Docket No. ACJC 2007-097, available at 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2007-097_Rivera-Soto%20Presentment.pdf. (insert page numbers).  After 
the incident, Justice Rivera-Soto was then investigated (though not sanctioned) for using the name of an investigator 
involved in the manslaughter trial of NBA star Jayson Williams during oral argument, despite the fact that the 
information was under seal.  Michael Rispoli, Justice Rivera-Soto Will Not Face Sanctions for Violating Court 
Order, STAR-LEDGER, Mar. 27, 2009,  available at 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/03/justice_riverasoto_will_not_fa.html.  The investigator had made a racial 
slur about Williams during the investigation.  Id.  
190
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20, 2010.
192
  Despite strong opposition,
193
 Governor Christie has stated that he will not reappoint 
Justice Wallace because the court has invaded the provinces of the legislative and executive 
branches.
194
  While he declined to comment specifically on any particular decision (including 
Lewis v. Harris), he did cite the Abbott v. Burke school-funding cases relied upon by the Lewis 
plaintiffs in their March 2010 motion as an example of the Supreme Court “legislating from the 
bench.”195  If the Governor is setting the stage to persuade the court to overrule or distinguish 
existing precedent, the reference may not bode well for the Lewis plaintiffs.   
The Governor has nominated Republican attorney and former member of the Attorney 
General’s Office Anne Murray Patterson. 196  Should Patterson’s nomination be approved, it 
would bring the bench to three Republicans, three Democrats.  She has a strong executive 
background and thus might be hoped to exercise an independence in judgment similar to Chief 
Justice Rabner’s.197  However, Governor Christie has stated that her record indicates a broader 
deference for being a member of “a co-equal branch of government” than Justice Wallace.198  
Given the Governor’s disapproving remarks regarding the original Lewis v. Harris decision, that 
deference may call for defeating the Lewis plaintiff’s motion. 
 The Plaintiffs’ legal arguments are sound.  However, regardless of the court’s 
composition, the safest bet is probably to take the middle road and grant the Plaintiff’s motion, 
                                                          
192
  Dopp, supra note 160. 
193
  Justice Wallace is the first sitting Justice in the history of the New Jersey Supreme Court not to be reappointed, 
and the only African American member of the bench.  Id.  Governor Christie’s failure to reappoint him has been 
deemed a “slap in the face to the huge African- American population in this state,” and Senate President Stephen 
Sweeney has said that he will not authorize confirmation hearings on the nomination of Justice Wallace’s 
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but only in part:  refuse to order amendment of the marriage laws based solely on the report of 
the Commission, appoint a Special Magistrate to further develop the factual record, and defer the 
decision for another few years until New Jersey has a court, a Governor, and a public who are 
comfortable with the idea of celebrating the relationships of all of its citizens.
199
  Given recent 
inactivity in the Senate and our current Governor’s openly hostile views on same-sex marriage, 
even the more liberal members of the court may hesitate to openly lock horns with the legislative 
and executive branches.  Appointing a Special Magistrate might seem like the easy way out, but 
then again, the court has already dodged the issue of same-sex marriage once in the original 
Lewis v. Harris holding.  But on the up side, it means that a marriage amendment will at least 
live to fight another day. 
Conclusion 
In Lewis v. Harris, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the State’s discriminatory 
practices towards same-sex couples violated the equal rights guarantee of the state constitution 
and ordered the Legislature to rectify the constitutional violation within 180 days.
200
  Despite the 
court’s clear order in Lewis, state-sanctioned discrimination continues almost four years later.  
The Civil Union Review Commission has found that civil unions do not confer the same rights 
and benefits as marriage, and their findings are in keeping with a slowly emerging body of 
national law which suggests something that the courts long-ago purported to deduce:  separate is 
                                                          
199
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not equal.
201
  Despite best intentions, civil unions do not correct a constitutional wrong.  Instead, 
they only intensify it by highlighting the differences between how heterosexual and homosexual 
couples are viewed by society.   
Nonetheless, in spite of the fact that the New Jersey legislature has violated a Supreme 
Court Order, a marriage amendment may still be further off than equality advocates would like to 
admit.  Lewis Plaintiffs will be returning to the Supreme Court in June 2010 for a motion in aid 
of litigants’ rights to enforce the original order, but the court’s ultimate decision may turn on a 
mixture of law, politics, and bravado.  The court has changed since Lewis was originally decided, 
and is likely to change again within the next two years as its members face reappointment and 
retirement.  While Lewis Plaintiffs have a good case based on the Commission’s findings, there 
are a few wildcards on the bench and the court may ultimately decide to further develop the 
factual record before locking horns with both the legislative and executive branches. 
 Despite the outcome of Lewis II, this state must continue to fight for the equality of all of 
its citizens.  Same-sex marriage is important to the dignity of everyone, regardless of sexual 
orientation.  As the Commission noted, there are both tangible and intangible differences in the 
ways in which opposite- and same-sex couples’ unions are treated.  While the tangible 
differences may have an impact on a couple’s wallet, the intangible differences amount to far 
more than dollars and cents.  George Bernard Shaw once said that “[t]here is no subject on which 
more dangerous nonsense is talked and thought than marriage.”202  Certainly, of all the nonsense 
spoken on the subject, perhaps the most dangerous of all is to allow politics and ignorance to 
prevail in matters of the heart. 
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